Transcript [00:00] This is part two of our series on the [00:02] history of Christian Zionism and the US [00:04] Israel relationship. In part one, we [00:06] discussed the origins of Christian [00:09] Zionism. [00:11] In part two, now we're going to talk [00:12] about the founding of the state of [00:14] Israel. [00:16] How did that happen? What role did [00:18] Christian Zionists play? [00:20] What role did US foreign policy play? [00:23] And how did people react when their [00:26] dreams of a modern state of Israel were [00:28] realized? [00:29] Let's find out. [00:59] >> You know, once we move into the era of [01:03] you know, the actual attempt by Jews in [01:08] uh British Palestine to start building [01:11] the state what is now what became the [01:13] state of Israel, [01:15] we really enter the world of American [01:17] foreign policy history. Things like the [01:19] Blackstone Memorial didn't really have [01:21] an impact. The United States was not an [01:24] influential power in the Middle East in [01:27] the 1800s. [01:29] But, you know, by the end of World War [01:31] I, with the British have established the [01:34] Balfour Mandate, and which allows the uh [01:38] creation of a Jewish homeland in [01:42] territory taken from the Ottomans at the [01:44] end of World War I. And now the [01:46] Americans get into the act, and from, [01:49] you know, roughly 1919-1920 [01:52] on, America starts to play uh a [01:56] significant role in these events. [01:59] And if we want to try to understand that [02:01] role, um, we have to look at the ideas [02:04] that Americans had about the world at [02:07] the end of World War I. [02:09] Because something that that was true [02:11] then and is true now [02:13] is that Americans, by and large, don't [02:16] make up their foreign don't sort of [02:19] make up their foreign policy about [02:22] Israel in a way that's fundamentally [02:24] different from the way they do it about [02:26] other things. [02:28] That is, you know, if you want to [02:29] understand a particular American [02:32] president's approach to Israel, [02:35] what you would look at is how does that [02:38] president see [02:40] America's interests globally? [02:43] How does the Middle East fit into that [02:46] vision of the American interest? And [02:48] then, how does Israel fit into that that [02:52] vision of the Middle East? [02:54] And usually, I'd say almost always, [02:57] that's the best guide to understanding [02:59] the strategy of a particular American [03:01] administration around Israel. [03:09] Henry Cabot Lodge was a Republican [03:12] senator from Massachusetts. [03:14] He was a good friend of Theodore [03:16] Roosevelt. He hated, um, Woodrow Wilson. [03:20] And is often blamed or in some cases [03:23] credited for the defeat of Woodrow [03:26] Wilson's proposed League of Nations in [03:30] the Senate after World War I. [03:33] And Henry Cabot Lodge, though he was not [03:36] an isolationist, he had a had a [03:39] a vision of [03:41] American interests around the world, out [03:44] of which he had a he had an idea about [03:46] how, you know, the American approach to [03:49] the Jewish question as it was still [03:51] called or the Palestine question, as [03:53] people sometimes called it. [03:55] And here was the idea. [03:58] This came at a time when immigration was [04:01] as big a political issue [04:04] in the United States as it is today. [04:11] Uh people forget this often, but levels [04:16] of immigration in the United States but [04:18] from about 1880 through the start of [04:21] World War I broke massively broke all [04:25] previous records. [04:27] Um and why did this happen? [04:30] Well, you know, technology, which is at [04:33] the root of so much in the modern world, [04:34] was at the root of this. [04:36] You think about people immigrating to [04:39] America in the 1830s. Basically, what [04:42] you did was you got on a wooden ship, [04:45] you know, maybe it had a little bit of [04:47] uh steam power, but actually on the [04:49] ocean still it was a sailing ship. It [04:51] would take a long time to cross the [04:53] ocean. You could The ships were small, [04:55] so not many people could get on a boat. [04:58] And not only that, there were certain [05:00] times of the year when it was too stormy [05:02] or whatever to make the trip. So, there [05:04] was a natural limit to the amount of [05:07] immigration that would come into the US [05:09] in any given year. Not only that, [05:12] you couldn't get to America from [05:15] everywhere in Europe very easily. What I [05:17] mean? Well, if there wasn't a port right [05:20] near you that had ships that were [05:23] sailing to the Americas, all right, how [05:25] did you get there? There were no [05:27] railroads, there were no cars, there [05:28] were no planes. You either walked or you [05:31] got on a horse and you rode, or maybe [05:33] you rode a barge down a river. [05:36] So, [05:37] immigration into the United States was [05:40] limited in number, and it was also kind [05:43] of geographically limited in range. [05:47] All right. By the end of the 19th [05:48] century, 1880s and 1890s, you have [05:51] massive steel, [05:53] you know, ironclad, [05:55] steel steel built passenger ships that [05:59] can bring hundreds of people over. The [06:02] the trip, the time for the trip goes [06:04] down to almost nothing. They can make it [06:06] in a few days. [06:07] Uh these ships are much less affected by [06:10] weather, so it's like round the clock. [06:12] Hamburg America America Hamburg back [06:16] back back back all year round. And not [06:19] only that, as the railroads have gone [06:21] out through Europe, you can now get [06:23] from, you know, the tiniest town in [06:26] Ukraine or Russia or even, you know, in [06:29] the Balkans or wherever, you can get to [06:32] a port that has cheap ships going to the [06:37] United States, and immigration starts [06:39] getting up, you know, past a million a [06:42] year, get getting to levels where the [06:44] percentage is, you know, of immigrants [06:46] in the population is, you know, at [06:48] levels we hadn't seen in recent until [06:51] very recently. [06:53] And not only that, the immigrants that [06:55] are coming in have a greater cultural [06:58] difference from the people already [07:00] living in the US than past waves of [07:02] immigrants had done. [07:04] And immigration just becomes a huge huge [07:08] political issue in the United States. [07:11] It dies down a little bit. World War I [07:13] comes and there's no crossing back and [07:15] forth. And by the way, that when the [07:18] waves of European immigrants are stopped [07:20] by the war, and yet the factories in the [07:23] north are are going full tilt to make [07:27] stuff, you know, goods for the war, [07:30] uh you actually that's when you get the [07:31] great migration of blacks from the [07:34] American South, but also of kind of [07:37] rednecks and hillbillies, my people, [07:39] from the American South going up to the [07:42] urban areas of the north instead of the [07:44] European immigrants. [07:45] Anyway, World War I ends and suddenly, [07:49] you know, the the waves of immigration [07:52] start building again. And at this point [07:55] the kind of resistance [07:58] uh which at first was like only like [08:00] people who had like, I don't know, they [08:02] were sort of racist or they were just [08:05] very, very xenophobic, but it gradually [08:07] spreads to where just about everybody [08:11] says, "Enough. We need a break." [08:14] And basically in in 1923, the United [08:17] States closes the door, slams [08:19] immigration shut, cuts it by like 90% [08:23] and we don't reopen for almost 50 years. [08:27] All right? Henry Cabot Lodge is very [08:29] much involved in that. [08:31] Uh the idea is that immigration to [08:34] America cannot be the answer to the [08:37] world's humanitarian or social problems. [08:47] After World War I, what we would do is [08:49] what we would do is we'd give every [08:51] country in Europe self-determination. [08:54] The Poles would no longer be divided [08:57] between the Russian, Austrian, and [08:58] German empires. The Austro-Hungarian [09:01] Empire would break up and all these [09:03] countries, you know, these peoples could [09:05] run themselves in their own way. The [09:08] Irish managed to get themselves out from [09:11] under the British. [09:12] And so, you know, the idea was that [09:15] okay, these countries can now govern [09:16] themselves [09:18] in peace, democratically. [09:21] And you know, if they screw it up, it's [09:23] not our fault. If they're hungry and [09:25] screaming about wanting to emigrate, [09:27] well, they need to rule themselves [09:29] better. Uh but we've given them a [09:31] chance. We've done our part. [09:35] And this was a general [09:38] including, by the way, the Americans [09:40] really did, you know, at this point [09:41] we're basically opposed to the European [09:43] colonization. [09:45] Uh you know, we we actually wanted um [09:48] freedom for the Arabs from British and [09:50] and uh French colonialism. You know, [09:54] support for an end to Brit- the British [09:57] Empire in India is growing in America. [10:00] The idea is let people govern themselves [10:03] around the world, be responsible for [10:05] their own actions, but they don't bring [10:08] their problems over here. [10:10] And this was um Henry Cabot Lodge was [10:13] involved in all of this stuff. [10:16] Um [10:17] And at the same time, okay, what about [10:21] the Jews? [10:22] The Jews now have lived, you know, they [10:24] were getting persecuted in a lot of [10:26] Europe, including after World War I, [10:28] it's still going on. What's the answer? [10:30] You're saying, okay, the Poles, you [10:32] can't emigrate to America anymore, but [10:34] you can have Poland and rule Poland and [10:37] you'll be fine. The Irish, your your [10:40] numbers are coming down for immigration [10:42] to the US, but you've got a free [10:43] Ireland, you can do what you want there, [10:46] etc., etc. Well, what about the Jews? [10:49] The answer, as Americans saw it at the [10:51] time, was support the Balfour Mandate, [10:54] support the idea of a British homeland, [10:58] uh sorry, Jewish homeland in British [11:00] Palestine. [11:02] And that will give that that's the [11:04] answer to Jewish immigration into the [11:08] United States. [11:10] We'll be [11:11] People didn't see this as special [11:13] treatment for the Jews. They saw this as [11:16] the application of the general [11:19] principles of American foreign policy to [11:24] the specific conditions of the Jewish [11:26] people. [11:32] Again, at the time [11:34] um, you know, you're you're drawing all [11:36] these boundaries, you know, what are the [11:38] boundaries of the of Czechoslovakia as [11:41] it was then known, now it's two [11:42] countries, the Czech Republic and [11:44] Slovakia, you know, Hungary, Croat- you [11:47] know, the Yugoslavia, blah, blah, blah. [11:49] What's Poland, what's Germany, and so on [11:51] and so forth. And what you find is that [11:54] nobody gets everything they want. Right? [11:58] The Poles cannot have all the territory [12:01] that ever belonged to historic Poland or [12:04] where some Poles live. The Russians [12:07] can't have everything. The Hungarians [12:10] certainly can't have everything. The [12:11] Greeks can't have everything they want [12:13] because they all kind of want the same [12:15] things. And you have to draw a boundary [12:17] somewhere. And so the answer is [12:20] partition. [12:21] Often, by the way, the answer is ethnic [12:23] cleansing. Hundreds of thousands of [12:26] people are moved at this time from one [12:28] of these new post-World War I boundary [12:31] places to another. I mean, you know, [12:34] huge numbers of Greeks are basically [12:36] forced out of what's now Turkey, and [12:38] ditto for Turks forced out of what is [12:41] now Greece and other countries in the [12:43] Balkans. Big flows of refugees back and [12:46] forth as this kind of settling of [12:49] populations happens. [12:52] So, in the eyes of people at the time, [12:55] the American support for the Balfour [12:57] Declaration, which was written into law, [13:01] that the United States would support [13:03] this establishment of a Jewish homeland [13:05] in Palestine, was written into law in [13:08] the '20s, um, by heavy majorities in [13:12] both parties supported it. [13:14] And that's pretty much, you know, that [13:16] was really the start of over a hundred [13:19] years of official American support for [13:22] this idea of a Jewish homeland in [13:24] Palestine conceived as part of a larger [13:28] approach to the enormous problems of [13:31] ethnic warfare and quarrels all over [13:35] Ottoman and former Ottoman Empire, [13:37] former Russian Empire, German Empire, [13:39] Austro-Hungarian Empire, this huge [13:42] cauldron [13:44] of peoples that had lived under the same [13:47] flags for centuries, but now [13:51] couldn't do it anymore, didn't want to [13:52] do it anymore. How do you divide up all [13:54] this territory? Who goes where? It was [13:57] in that context [13:59] that a guy like Henry Cabot Lodge saw [14:02] American support for the Jewish state, a [14:06] Jewish homeland, as being central sort [14:09] of being part of a general American [14:12] approach to foreign policy. [14:19] One of the things that I've found as [14:21] I've looked into this incredibly [14:23] complicated topic [14:25] is that while pro-Zionist and [14:28] anti-Zionist writers often differ [14:32] bitterly about all kinds of things, [14:35] there actually a lot of things that that [14:37] they agree on. And you would expect, [14:39] well, if that's true, then they must be [14:41] right. But actually, very often when [14:42] they agree, they're both wrong. [14:45] And one of the great examples of this [14:49] is a story that in the American Jewish [14:52] community is a kind of a almost a [14:54] foundation myth of American Jewish [14:58] attitudes toward Israel and and their [15:00] impact on American politics. And that [15:03] is, oh, it's it's the spring of 1948. [15:08] The fate of the Jews hangs in the [15:11] balance. America had been supporting um [15:15] the the creation of a Jewish state, but [15:18] now clouds of war are gathering. [15:21] But Harry Truman, the American [15:24] president, has announced that America is [15:27] is not going to support immediate [15:29] independence, but wants more mediation [15:32] and delay. What are we going to do? [15:35] Well, [15:36] the Jew the Jewish leadership tries [15:39] talking to him, nothing. He refuses [15:41] refuses to meet with anybody from [15:43] Israel, from the American Jewish [15:45] community. He's fed up. He doesn't want [15:47] to do it. Well, [15:49] there's one guy. [15:52] Harry Truman had had a Jewish business [15:54] partner back right after World War I [15:57] when they had [15:59] worked together in a clothing store. [16:02] And this guy, [16:04] you know, comes in to Harry Truman as a [16:07] personal friend. [16:09] And almost like Esther in the Bible, he [16:12] goes to the moody gentile ruler [16:15] and says, "Please do me this one thing." [16:17] He wanted Truman to meet with the head [16:21] of the [16:22] official head of the Jewish authority, [16:25] Chaim Weizmann. [16:27] And Truman, because it's his friend, [16:30] says, "Fine, I'll meet with him." But, [16:32] doesn't really want to. Then Truman [16:34] meets with Weizmann [16:36] and Israel is saved. [16:39] Now, that's a story that you'll find [16:41] people in the kind of, [16:43] you know, AIPAC lobby world saying, "You [16:47] know, it means that even the, you know, [16:49] American Jews can make a difference. We [16:52] can really shape policy. Let's get in [16:54] and do it." But, also, you know, people [16:57] who think of the, you know, the Israel [16:59] lobby is all powerful or Jewish [17:01] conspiracies run the world see, see, [17:02] see, you know, the State Department told [17:04] Truman this was a dumb idea. The CIA [17:07] told Truman this was a dumb idea. The [17:09] Pentagon told Truman this was a dumb [17:11] idea, but that Jews made him do it. [17:14] All right. And you actually look at that [17:16] story, [17:18] the amazing thing is that after talking [17:21] with Weizmann, [17:23] Truman did not change his policy. [17:26] Right up until the moment that the [17:29] Israelis declared independence, the [17:32] United States was doing everything it [17:34] could to try to persuade them to [17:36] postpone it. [17:37] And to come up with some new plan that [17:40] would put both the Israeli the Jewish [17:43] and the and the Arab parts of British [17:45] Palestine into um some kind of UN [17:50] trusteeship mandate, something that [17:53] would stop the war from breaking out. [17:57] So, in fact, if you actually look at the [18:00] historical record, the world leader who [18:03] had the most to do with the emergence of [18:06] the Jewish state was not Harry Truman. [18:10] It was Joseph Stalin. [18:13] And Joseph Stalin didn't do it to help [18:15] the United States. [18:17] Uh he he thought that what he was going [18:19] to do was he was going to do two things. [18:22] He was going to [18:24] uh he hoped he would break the British [18:25] Empire in the Middle East. And he hoped [18:28] that he would drive a wedge between the [18:31] United States and Britain. [18:33] And uh he didn't succeed in quite quite [18:36] as much as he wanted, but but the those [18:39] were his motives. [18:46] What had happened was that in late 1947, [18:50] the UN General Assembly had voted by a [18:53] very narrow margin, uh reached just the [18:57] required a 2/3 majority, but they just [18:59] barely got there, and basically because [19:01] the Soviet Union and its some of its uh [19:04] allies and satellites voted in favor, [19:06] uh voted for a partition plan that would [19:10] establish Jewish and Arab states as the [19:13] British left Palestine. [19:16] The Zionists, the the the Jews of [19:19] Palestine accepted the plan. They didn't [19:21] like it. It didn't It didn't by any [19:22] means give them everything they wanted. [19:24] The Arabs reject rejected it. [19:27] They said, "Why does this international [19:29] organization have the right to divide [19:32] Arab territory? We just don't see it." [19:35] Um [19:36] and uh [19:38] and war began to to come forth. The US [19:41] immediately put an arms embargo on both [19:45] sides. We're not going to help this war [19:47] get started. We're not doing it. Um and [19:50] the British are selling arms to the [19:53] Arabs. [19:55] Uh they're selling arms to the [19:56] Egyptians. They're selling They're not [19:57] only selling arms to the Jordanians. [20:00] They're actually the the leading [20:03] uh element of the Jordanian army is led [20:06] by a British general and British-trained [20:09] officers. [20:11] Um [20:13] and so the Jews have no place to buy [20:16] arms. [20:18] Um they're [20:20] scouring the black markets of the world, [20:22] and there were some black markets in the [20:24] world in the wake of World War II to try [20:26] to find something. [20:27] But they're not getting anything until [20:29] one day a group of Jewish delegates is [20:33] sitting in a hotel in Paris. What the [20:35] heck are we going to get some arms? [20:36] What's going to happen? This guy knocks [20:38] on the door says, "Hello." He says, "I'm [20:39] an arms trader. You want arms? That's no [20:42] problem." He starts showing them all [20:43] these pictures and a catalog of all [20:45] these modern weapons, and they're going, [20:47] "What is this?" Well, it turns out that [20:51] Czechoslovakia, [20:52] which was under had was coming under [20:55] communist rule, [20:56] um [20:58] was had a an arms factory, the Škoda [21:01] arms factory, [21:03] which had been making actually literally [21:05] weapons for the Nazis during World War [21:08] II. But in May of 1945, the Germans [21:12] stopped buying Škoda weapons and they [21:14] had all of you know they had tanks, they [21:16] had machine guns, they had all of the [21:18] stuff [21:19] and no market for it. Some of it, by the [21:21] way, still had the the emblems of German [21:26] Nazi symbols on the on the various [21:28] weapons. [21:30] But Czechoslovakia was desperate for [21:32] hard currency. [21:34] Um because as it went communist, it you [21:37] know as so often happens, you you go [21:39] communist and you start immediately [21:41] having big financial problems. [21:43] And they needed they needed the money. [21:47] But also, [21:48] Stalin wanted to help foment a war in [21:52] Palestine that would create a massive [21:55] crisis for the British throughout the [21:57] Middle East. And this was a great way to [22:00] do it. He had lots of other reasons for [22:01] this anyway, but he gave permission for [22:04] the Czechs to sell weapons to the Jews. [22:07] And these weapons start coming into [22:11] Israel into modern Israel [22:13] in the spring of 1940 48. [22:17] And as the Jews had been losing the war, [22:20] the violence starts in December, I [22:22] think, of '47. And in those first [22:25] months, the Jews are actually slowly [22:27] retreating and losing different [22:30] settlements across the the area. [22:34] Um and [22:36] but with these weapons, the the tide [22:38] starts to turn. The Americans didn't [22:40] know the weapons were coming, the [22:41] British didn't know the weapons were [22:43] coming. But these weapons actually allow [22:46] the Jews to win the war, a war that the [22:48] Americans thought they were destined to [22:51] lose. [23:00] >> not really [23:01] do very much to help Israel win that [23:05] war. [23:06] He recognized Israel, [23:08] but that that was for complicated set of [23:11] domestic reasons which didn't actually [23:13] have very much to do with the Jewish [23:15] vote. [23:16] Um and but [23:19] it was in his interest [23:21] in American his American political [23:23] interest to be a big friend to appear as [23:26] a very great friend to Israel if he [23:28] could. [23:30] Now, this may blow your minds, [23:32] but in the 1940s and 1950s, Israel was a [23:36] left-wing cause. All right? This was [23:40] like Stalin was backing the Jews in the [23:43] war for independence. [23:45] Communists everywhere, yay, yay, yay, [23:48] Jews, boo, Arabs, boo, Palestinians. All [23:51] right? And into the 1950s, [23:54] um social the Democratic Socialists of [23:57] America, DSA, would point to Israel as [23:59] the great great poster child for [24:01] socialism. People say you can't have a [24:04] strong defense budget under socialism, [24:07] look at Israel. [24:08] People say you can't have freedom under [24:10] socialism, look at Israel. People say [24:14] you can't develop economically with [24:16] socialism, look at Israel. Israel was [24:18] the poster child of socialism in the [24:21] 1940s and 50s. And so for Harry Truman, [24:24] wanting to keep the left wing of his [24:27] party united with him, especially for [24:30] the election of '48, which was a tough [24:31] election for him, [24:33] looking friendly to Israel and taking [24:36] credit for Israel was was something that [24:39] he wanted to do. [24:41] So, [24:43] he would [24:44] um [24:45] and I think after a while he probably [24:46] believed it. [24:48] But if that that and he, you know, he [24:50] somebody once said, "Oh, you're like [24:51] Cyrus." He said, "What do you mean like [24:53] Cyrus? I am Cyrus. I am the [24:56] like the great Persian Empire emperor [24:58] who allowed the Jews back into back into [25:01] Jerusalem [25:03] after the Babylonian exile. [25:05] Uh but I think, you know, Stalin [25:07] probably had a better claim to be Cyrus [25:10] than Harry Truman did. [25:17] We take the whole kind of theory that [25:19] somehow the Israel lobby or the Jewish [25:23] lobby drives American policy in the [25:26] Middle East. I mean, to me this is just [25:28] sort of, you know, completely crazy. [25:32] And that, [25:33] you know, you actually you can go back [25:35] into the 1930s and you hear you'll hear [25:37] people like Father Coughlin, like the [25:39] uh Lindberghs and you know, this whole [25:42] sort of host of people saying, "The Jews [25:45] run the world. The Jews run America. The [25:47] Jews run the Roosevelt administration." [25:50] But you actually look and what's going [25:52] on is, you know, Nazi Germany is getting [25:55] more anti-Jewish by the day and American [25:59] Jews can't even get a few extra visas [26:02] for Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany. [26:06] You know, their political power is so [26:08] weak. [26:09] Um [26:10] they're told that they shouldn't even [26:12] raise the question of immigration quotas [26:14] in Congress because Congress will cut [26:17] the quotas rather than allowing more [26:19] Jews in. [26:21] Then they uh then World War II comes. [26:24] You know, what do the Jewish leaders [26:25] want to ask the White House? They say, [26:28] "Could you please spare a few American [26:32] bombers to bomb the rail lines leading [26:35] to Auschwitz so that Jews heading toward [26:38] the extermination camps don't get [26:41] there?" [26:43] And the White House basically blows them [26:45] off. [26:47] Says, "Look, you know, we can't, you [26:48] know, we got a war to win here and we [26:50] can't be sort of, you know, dividing our [26:53] forces for every little project that [26:55] comes up. They can't even get the White [26:57] House to bomb Auschwitz. But then, you [27:00] know, 1948, [27:02] people say, "Ah, it was the Jews that [27:04] forced Harry Truman to support Israel." [27:07] We've already said he didn't do that [27:09] much support. But again, how did the [27:10] Jews go from 1944, [27:13] they can't get some bombers for [27:15] Auschwitz, to 1948, "Oh, they're all [27:18] powerful. They make Truman do whatever [27:20] he want whatever they want." [27:22] Right? [27:23] Uh and then again, actually, we find in [27:25] the early Cold War, [27:27] um and for the first 25 years of Israeli [27:31] independence, America isn't supporting [27:34] Israel. [27:36] There's this sort of again, there's this [27:38] legend that the US has always, you know, [27:40] we always support Israel. We don't. We [27:43] haven't. [27:44] Back when Israel really needed an ally, [27:47] back when it was quite weak and quite [27:50] poor, a country of refugees, [27:53] uh half of them from the Holocaust, half [27:55] of them driven out of Middle Eastern [27:57] countries, um [27:59] you know, by nationalist Arabs after the [28:02] the war in Palestine, [28:04] all of this, you know, they figured [28:06] really use some help. The US was much [28:09] more interested in working with Nasser, [28:12] um Egypt was getting a lot of US aid, [28:15] and when Israel was getting nothing. [28:18] It's not until 1973 [28:21] that the US begins to actually uh become [28:25] much more strategically aligned with [28:27] Israel. Now, you know, why was that? [28:37] Basically, America saw the Middle East [28:41] through the lens of the Cold War in the [28:43] 1940s, '50s, '60s, and '70s. As indeed, [28:47] the Cold War was kind of the organizing [28:49] principle [28:50] for American thinking about foreign [28:52] policy all around the world. The Middle [28:54] East was no exception. [28:56] And so, how do we see that? [28:58] Uh well, we wanted to keep the Soviet [29:01] Union out. [29:03] And we want to keep communism out. [29:06] We especially wanted to keep it out of [29:08] the Gulf because the oil was important [29:11] then as it is now. [29:13] And we wanted to keep it out of Egypt [29:15] because Egypt was the most developed, [29:17] advanced, richest at the time Arab [29:19] country, and there was that little thing [29:21] known as the Suez Canal in it. [29:24] Um and so and and so what the Americans [29:27] were doing with the Egyptians is we're [29:28] saying, "Look, you guys want to First of [29:31] all, we're not like the British and the [29:32] French. We're not colonialists. We We [29:34] haven't had colonies. We don't want [29:36] colonies. We're trying to push them to [29:38] get rid of their colonies. We want you [29:40] guys to develop. And here's the thing. [29:43] You can develop Egypt faster and better [29:46] working with us, with our technology, [29:49] our financing, and all of this. We can [29:52] make We can help you realize your dreams [29:54] better than those lunkheads in Moscow [29:56] can do." That was the American approach. [29:59] And so, we wanted to work with the [30:01] Egyptian army, which [30:03] and the social science of the time saw [30:06] arm you know, the armed forces as often [30:09] the modernizing elements in [30:12] post-colonial countries. They were the [30:13] most organized, most technologically [30:16] trained. They were often more [30:18] meritocratic than the sort of somewhat [30:20] feudal political establishments that you [30:23] found a lot of those places, etc. [30:25] Um and so, we spent a lot of the 1950s [30:29] trying to build a deep relationship with [30:31] Egypt that would then make Egypt part of [30:34] Team West rather than Team [30:37] uh [30:38] USSR. [30:40] We failed in that, largely because what [30:43] Nasser didn't Nasser didn't just want to [30:45] modernize Egypt. [30:48] He wanted to make Egypt the nucleus of a [30:51] pan-Arab state. He wanted to do with the [30:55] Arabs in a way what Bismarck did with [30:57] the Germans to unify these scattered [31:01] relatively weak countries into one big [31:03] power, which by the way would include [31:06] the Saudis, the Kuwaitis, that all of [31:08] that oil would be under his Nasser's [31:12] rule, and that would make the Arab [31:14] countries a great power again as they'd [31:17] been in the early days of the Islamic [31:19] caliphate, though Nasser was certainly [31:22] no [31:23] Islamic [31:25] jihadi or anything like that. [31:27] So, um [31:29] so Nasser's ambitions [31:32] and US policy could never really work [31:35] together, and he ended up being much [31:37] closer to the Soviets than he was to the [31:39] Americans. But even so, [31:42] we felt that any aid that we gave or any [31:45] favor that we gave to Israel would [31:48] inflame [31:49] Nasser against us. [31:52] And actually in 1956, when the when [31:55] working with the British and the French, [31:56] the Israelis uh drove the Egyptians out [32:00] of the Sinai, we forced the the Israelis [32:03] to hand all that land back to the [32:06] Egyptians. [32:08] Um it's not uh and a lot of our policy [32:11] under President Kennedy in the 1960s [32:14] was aimed at trying to prevent Israel [32:16] from getting a new nuclear weapons. The [32:19] French, partly in order to spite us, [32:22] um were Israel's closest allies at the [32:25] time, and they were trying to um and [32:29] they were giving nuclear technology to [32:31] Israel [32:32] um as part of what they saw was a common [32:34] effort against Arab nationalism. [32:37] Well, [32:38] um so Kennedy was working really, really [32:41] hard to keep the Israelis from [32:44] developing a weapon. [32:46] Uh it's not really until 1973 [32:49] when Israel has already won the Six-Day [32:51] War without American weapons or help. [32:54] Um [32:55] and then developed nuclear weapons again [32:58] against American opposition. So Israel [33:01] gets an American alliance [33:04] when they have already become a regional [33:07] superpower with nuclear weapons. [33:11] So this idea that only American support [33:14] keeps Israel going [33:16] or that Israel is incapable of acting [33:20] without American support is not [33:23] historically supported. They made [33:25] themselves a power almost in despite of [33:29] our policy. They remember this even if [33:32] Americans tend to forget it. [33:40] In the 1970s, what happens is the [33:42] Soviets really start to make a play for [33:45] the Middle East in a in a in a new way. [33:48] They've got a great relationship with [33:49] Egypt. They've got a great relationship [33:52] with Syria. [33:53] And they're arming them both. [33:56] Um the Egyptians and the Syrians attack [33:59] the Israelis in the fall of 1973 [34:04] for a couple of days really looks as if [34:06] they're winning the war. Not only do the [34:08] Egyptians cross the Suez Canal and and [34:12] start penetrating, but the Syrians are [34:15] coming on the north or advancing and the [34:18] Israelis are overstretched. [34:20] The Soviet Union is talking about [34:22] sending ships, even nuclear armed ships [34:26] through the Dardanelles from the Black [34:30] Sea into the Mediterranean [34:32] and reinforcing Syria and Egypt and the [34:35] Israelis are coming to the Americans and [34:38] this is the moment when Nixon [34:41] who if you ever listen to the Nixon [34:43] tapes or read those archives was [34:45] probably the most anti-Semitic American [34:48] president after World War II. [34:51] Um [34:52] uh and who had absolutely no support [34:55] from American Jews was hated [34:58] generally hated by the American Jewish [35:00] community and even more in '73 when the [35:03] Watergate scandal was at its height. [35:06] Nixon is the one who on purely national [35:09] security grounds shifts American policy [35:13] to to resupply Israel with weapons and [35:15] help them win that war. [35:18] Um and that and by the way I say the [35:20] American Jewish community didn't thank [35:23] Nixon for this. They didn't say, "Oh, [35:25] forget that Watergate." Nixon, you know, [35:28] that this this was not something that [35:31] the Jews pushed him into. It's something [35:33] that he saw on national security grounds [35:37] related to American Cold War strategy. [35:41] >> That wraps up part two of our [35:42] conversation. [35:44] Thank you, Walter, and thank you for [35:45] watching. [35:46] In the final chapter of this series on [35:49] the history of Christian Zionism and the [35:50] US-Israel relationship, we will once [35:52] again fast forward to the 21st century [35:55] and have a conversation about the [35:56] contemporary issues surrounding the [35:59] US-Israel relationship. [36:01] See you next time.
